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I. Introduction: The Difficult Relation between Aesthetics and 
Improvisation  
 
It is undeniable that the artistic significance and part of the social 
reputation of the practice of improvisation in Western culture diminished at 
the time that gave birth to 1) aesthetics as a philosophical discipline devoted 
to a particular kind of experience which is detached from everyday affairs, 
2) the so-called « system of the fine arts »
1
, and, partly as a result of the 
spread of typography
2
, 3) the triumph of the notion of the artwork even in 
the field of the performing arts
3
. 
The practice of improvising has been conceived as such an obvious 
and natural expression of the human being that it didn’t need a specific 
name until about the seventeenth century. Since Aristotle
4
 it has been 
understood as the origin of poetic creativity and – from the Greek bards, to 
Church music and the Commedia dell’arte (to mention only well-known 
cases) – it was widespread in many artistic fields as an ordinary and 
valuable way of art making. Then, as the different ways of making and 
experiencing art began to be organised and theorised, the verb « to 
improvise » appeared in various languages. The noun, « improvisation », 
was coined later, during the Romantic age, by Madame de Stael, who 
thereby showed that by now the difference between the action of 
improvising and its result was established
5
.  
                                                 
1
 Cf. P. O. Kristeller, « The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of 
Aesthetics », Part I in Journal of the History of Ideas, 12, 4, 1951, pp. 496-527, and Part II 
in Journal of the History of Ideas, 13, 1, 1952, pp. 17-46. 
2 
On writing and musical improvisation see D. Sparti, Il corpo sonoro, Bologna, il Mulino, 
2007. 
3 
See B. Nettle, « Introduction. An Art Neglected in Scholarship », in B. Nettl & M. Russell 
(eds.), In the Course of Performance, Chicago & London, The University of Chicago Press, 
1998, pp. 1-26 ; L. Goehr The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works. An Essay in the 
Philosophy of Music, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992. 
4
 Aristotle, Poetics 1448b7-1449a14. 
5
 See J.-F. de Raymond, L’improvisation. Contribution a la philosophie de l’action, Paris, 
Vrin, 1980, pp. 17-36 ; S. Blum, « Recognizing Improvisation », in In the Course of 
Performance, pp. 27-45, in part. pp. 37-40. 
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When it first acquired its proper name, the practice of improvisation 
was considered, especially in music, as another kind of composition and 
execution. Subsequently it was conceived as different from proper 
composition and as an exceptional activity (thus ceasing to be seen as the 
pristine and ordinary way of making art), but also as a practice that could 
scarcely reach the aesthetic and artistic values of composed artworks. The 
word still has this derogatory sense, when it means an activity that is not 
prepared and sufficiently organised. 
To sum up, and look forward: as it received, in the eighteenth 
century, the name that we still use, improvisation began to be considered as 
a practice that did not fit the requirements for the creation of artworks. For 
the main features of improvisation – among them : contingency, 
situationality, irreversibility, unrepeatability
6
 – contrast with the aim of 
creating enduring artworks intended to be offered to aesthetic contemplation 
that has no connection with or function in practical life. Conversely, due to 
its performative character, improvisation can invite participation, not only 
contemplation: therefore, it seems to have a special capacity to excite the 
audience, moving them to action, freedom and even anarchy. It can 
therefore be seen as about to violate the divide between stage and stalls, i.e. 
between art and life. It does not use imagination only for evoking fantastic 
and fictional worlds through objective and autonomous artworks exhibited 
in specific appropriate institutions like museums and concert halls, but 
rather as a tool for intervening in social and political life. As such it can be 
an ideological weapon. At least this is a leitmotiv, a common thread that 
connects disparate cultural trends, from the poetical performances of the 
Italian improvvisatori
7
 in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to free jazz 
and impro theatre of the last decades of the past century
8
. 
                                                 
6
 See A. Bertinetto, « Performing the Unexpected », Daimon, 57, 2012, pp. 117-135, here 
pp. 129-131. 
7
 Cf. A. Estherhammer, Romanticism and Improvisation 1750-1850, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
8
 See K. Lothwesen, Klang – Struktur – Konzept.  ie  edeutun  der  euen usi    r  ree 
Jazz und Improvisationsmusik, Bielefeld, Transcript, 2009 ; K. Johnston, Improvisation and 
the Theatre, London, Methuen Publishing, 1979 ; S. Nachmanovitch, Free Play. 
Improvisation in Life and Art, New York, Penguin, 1990 ; D. Belgrad, The Culture of 
Spontaneity. Improvisation and the Arts in Postwar America, Chicago & London, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1998 ; D. Sparti, Suoni inauditi. L’improvvisazione nel Jazz e 
nella vita quotidiana, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2005 ; D. Sparti, Musica in nero. Il campo 
discorsivo del jazz, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2007 ; D. Sparti, L’identità incompiuta. 
Paradossi dell’improvvisazione musicale, Bologna, il Mulino, 2010 ; W. M. Muyumba, 
The Shadow and the Act : Black Intellectual Practice, Jazz, Improvisation, and 
Philosophical Pragmatism, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2009 ; B. 
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As a matter of fact, improvisation, unlike other art practices and 
objects, does not delight exclusively because it distracts attention from 
everyday life; on the contrary, the pleasures of (some important genres and 
kinds of) artistic improvisation, may also be due to its ability to connect art 
and life
9
, i.e. to engage both performers and audience in actions which not 
only have striking moral, social and political significance (which is certainly 
not an exclusive prerogative of improvised art), but that, at least in some 
cases, are concrete interventions in the particular historical situations in 
which they occur and, as such, modify those situations. In improvisation the 
real seems to outstrip the possible and the imaginary. For this reason, I 
insist, improvisation seems to have an anti-institutional character that is at 
odds with the widespread view that the space of art is the imaginative 
autonomous dimension of the aesthetic experience that can flourish in 
locations erected for this special purpose. In this context, it is significant 
that at the end of the eighteenth century in Austria a law was passed that 
forbade theatrical improvisation for political reasons
10
. The then political 
rulers understood improvised theatre not as an expression of aesthetic art, 
that builds imaginary worlds in the fictional space of the stage, but as an 
illegal practice that directly intervenes in the real life of the audience, 
addressed as co-performers and invited to act to transform the socio-
historical situations in which they lived. Performance art of our time seems 
to have an analogous raison d'être
11
.  
However, though culturally oppressed and regarded with suspicion 
by cultural and political authorities, improvisation survived even in the 
context of the aesthetics of the artwork. On the one hand it survived as a less 
noble art that played a more limited role and was tolerated as a marginal 
form of artistic expression in different cultural fields. On the other hand, 
improvisation survived precisely at the heart of the autonomist aesthetics of 
genius (elaborated exemplarily by Kant and especially by Karl Philip 
                                                                                                                            
Altherhaug, « Improvisation on a Triple Theme: Creativity, Jazz Improvisation and 
Communication », Studia Musicologica Norvegica, 30, 2004 ; C. Béthune, Le Jazz et 
l’Occident, Paris, Klincksieck, 2008 ; D. P. Brown, Noise Orders. Jazz, Improvisation, and 
Architecture, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2006. 
9 
Cf. de Raymond, op. cit., pp. 212-213. 
10
 See R. Borgards, « Improvisation, Verbot, Genie. Zur Improvisationsästhetik bei 
Sonnenfels, Goethe, Spalding, Moritz und Novalis », in M. Mauss & R. Haeckel (eds.), 
Leib/Seele – Geist/Buchstabe. Dualismen in den Künsten um 1800 und 1900, Würzburg, 
Königshausen & Neumann, 2009, pp. 257-268. For the subversive power of (poetic) 
improvisation in the romantic age, see Estherhammer, op. cit., pp. 1-13. 
11 
Cf. E. Fischer-Lichte, Ästhetik des Performativen, Frankfurt a. M., Suhrkamp, 2004.  
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Moritz) and of its institutions (the museum, the concert hall, etc.) as well
12
. 
While replacing improvisation, the autonomist aesthetics of the artwork not 
only marginalised improvisation, but also assimilated some of its main 
features: in particular it assigned essential properties of improvisation – like 
spontaneity, self-referentiality, and autonomy (the power of engendering its 
own rule) – to artistic creation and the products thereof. In the process, 
however, some of the values of improvisation changed. Autonomist 
aesthetics anaesthetised the performative effects of improvisation, i.e. 
precisely its power of bridging the gap between artistic fiction and real life, 
by means of developing an organic aesthetics of the (textual) artwork, that 
in the realm of the imagination gets a life of its own, precisely because it is 
severed from real life. For this reason, the champions of the romantic 
movements and later of the avant-garde movements would have again to 
disrupt the artwork-aesthetics in order to re-affirm the performative power 
of art as an experience, that, as Gadamer argued, « changes the person 
experiencing it »
13
.  
As we have seen, the link between the artwork-aesthetics and 
improvisation is certainly ambiguous, limited, and rather hidden and subtle. 
Nonetheless, the practice of improvisation is surely not completely at odds 
with the autonomic aesthetics of the artwork, broadly understood (i.e. 
conceived in non-formalistic and non-objectivistic terms)
14
. In other words, 
improvisation is not an exclusive prerogative of a performance 
(anti)aesthetics radically opposed to artwork-aesthetics
15
. I think that the 
compatibility between both improvisation and artworks-aesthetics can be 
affirmed and understood precisely by exploring the reciprocal link between 
improvisation and imagination. The capacity of using imagination in 
producing, expressing and embodying aesthetic ideas, which contrast with 
the prosaic reality of our world, while at the same time illuminating it, is 
commonly considered as one of the main requirements for artistic 
production (and since the eighteenth century has been understood as the 
                                                 
12
 Cf. Borgards, op. cit., pp. 262-268; Estherhammer, op. cit., pp. 78-79; E. Landgraf, 
Improvisation as Art, London, Continuum, 2011, pp. 42-83. 
13
 H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, New York, SUNY Press, 1994, p. 102. 
14 
Generally speaking, non-formalistic aesthetic theories defend the view that aesthetic 
experience is not provided only by the formal features of artworks, but also by their content 
and meanings. Non objectivistic aesthetic theories favour the experiential values of our 
relation with artworks over detailed analysis concerning the ontological properties of 
aesthetic items.  
15
 This (anti-)aesthetics is defended in E. Fischer-Lichte’s previously cited book Ästhetik 
des Performativen. 
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main feature of the artistic genius). Moreover, the production of artworks by 
means of imagination is often conceived as spontaneous. So, since 
spontaneity – as we mentioned earlier – is a central property of 
improvisation
16
, it may be interesting to investigate on the one hand whether 
the spontaneity of imagination has improvisational features and, on the 
other, whether, and how, improvisation makes use of imagination. This 
could in turn show the tight and profound intertwinement between the 
practice of improvisation and the aesthetic dimension of art, despite their 
apparent opposition. 
In the first part of the paper (§§ 2-6) I will suggest that the way 
imagination works – in the aesthetic realm of the arts as well as in the 
cognitive dimension of experience and in social-political constructions – has 
improvisational traits. I will suggest that this is due to the fact that both 
imagination and improvisation proceed by means of an abductive method. 
In the second part of the paper (§§ 7-12), I will argue that in both 
everyday and artistic improvisation imaginative performances are set in 
motion, that may have valuable aesthetic outcomes. Moreover, I will defend 
the view that artistic improvisation succeeds as an art practice, if and when 
it involves organisational and creative imagination, i.e. if and when it 
performs imagination on the spot with valuable artistic and aesthetic results. 
On the one hand improvisation enacts imagination hic et nunc; on the other, 
in improvisation, as in any other artistic practice or method, imagination is 
the source of artistic formations that appear to be distinct from everyday 
reality. 
 
II. Meanings and Functions of Imagination: Organisational 
Imagination and Creative Imagination 
 
Since we assign different meanings to the word « imagination », a 
brief conceptual clarification is in order. We imagine something when we 
entertain a proposition without asserting it or when we entertain the concept 
or the phenomenal image of an object or of an action without being 
committed to the existence of the object or to performing the action
17
. 
                                                 
16 
On spontaneity in improvisation see J.-F. De Raymond, op. cit., pp. 17-65 ; D. Belgrad, 
The Culture of Spontaneity ; M. Santi (ed.), Improvisation. Between Technique and 
Spontaneity, Cambridge, Cambridge Scholar Publishing, 2010 ; R.K. Sawyer, 
« Improvisation and the Creative Process: Dewey, Collingwood, and the Aesthetics of 
Spontaneity », The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 58, 2000, pp. 149-161.  
17
 Cf. B. Gaut, « Creativity and Imagination », in B. Gaut & P. Livingston (eds.), The 
Creation of Art: New Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics, Cambridge, Cambridge 
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Therefore, in very general terms, imagination can be understood as the 
activity of entertaining propositions, objects and experiences, without 
asserting them or without believing in their actual existence, as, for 
example, in the capacity to make present in an image what is absent, and as 
in the ability to show something (a landscape, a human being, etc.) by 
means of the perception of something else (for example, a surface covered 
with pigments). 
The power of going beyond what is given to perception can be 
understood and evaluated in different ways. It can be seen, negatively, as a 
sensual, disordered and useless power which diverts our attention from the 
serious things of life, and especially from perceptual reality and from the 
rules of understanding (in this sense imagination can be conceived as a 
source of misperception and misunderstanding). Yet, in the course of the 
history of philosophy a host of thinkers have given positive accounts of 
imagination as mediation between perception and thought, as a kind of 
experiential thinking which can be sensibly embodied. 
In different ways and with different aims, imagination has been 
understood as a productive power, that makes perception possible, and is 
free from the rigid rules of the understanding, because it is a condition of 
the applicability (and/or even of the generation) of the rules of 
understanding. Hence, this kind of imagination, that we may call 
organisational imagination does not divert us from reality, on the contrary, it 
is a tool, as it were, in virtue of which we organise our experience of reality. 
On the other hand, however, imagination can be conceived of as 
qualitatively opposite to perception, as in, for example, Sartre’s account of 
imagination
18
. According to this view imagination faces us with what is not 
real, and cannot be useful for knowing or organising the real world. 
Anyway, according to a milder version of this notion of imagination, 
imagination is not simply the opposite of reality, but makes it possible to 
visualise different realities or to see actual reality differently. Through what 
we may call creative imagination we are offered contrafactual models of 
reality, as in the case of the construction of imaginary social and political 
landscapes
19
. And, more importantly for the present discussion, imagination, 
                                                                                                                            
University Press, 2003, pp. 148-73. 
18
 Cf. J.-P- Sartre, The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination, 
London, Routledge, 2010. 
19
 In this regard in the nineteenth century thinkers like Coleridge and Ralph Waldo 
Emerson preferred to use the word « fancy », in the sense of wilful fantasy. Emerson 
writes: «Imagination is central; fancy superficial. Fancy relates to surface, in which a great 
part of life lies. The lover is rightly said to fancy the hair, eyes, complexion of the maid. 
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as the capacity to make present what is unreal or absent, plays an 
irreplaceable role in the arts, both in organising the experience of reality and 
in manifesting different realities. As has been acknowledged at least since 
the eighteenth century, imagination is a kind of condition sine qua non of 
art. Art requires imagination because imagination makes it possible to see 
and hear different things in what we perceive (as has been argued for 
example by Richard Wollheim in his theory of twofoldness and by Roger 
Scruton in his theory of metaphor
20
) : thanks to imagination, we can hear 
sound as music and recognise the subject depicted in a pictorial 
representation. Moreover, as Kendal Walton paradigmatically argued
21
, 
imagination works in art as a game of make-believe, as, for example, in 
children’s games : it prompts us to experience and explore non-existent 
worlds fictionally and to understand our world better by means of 
comparing it with imaginary ones. Due to the virtues of imagination that I 
have just mentioned, one of the most common reasons for praising art is 
precisely its power to engage the imagination. Artists make their 
imagination work when they see possibilities of invention in the media they 
are interacting with. Their creative outcomes engage the imaginative 
activity of beholders and listeners. 
 
III. How Does Imagination Work? The Abductive Process of 
Imagination 
 
The hypothesis I will argue for is that both organisational and 
creative imagination work in an abductive way and this will prove important 
for arguing for the reciprocal connection between imagination and 
improvisation. Such a connection, in turn, could partly explain how and why 
improvisation is involved in the aesthetic experience of art.  
However, that imagination works abductively could sound an odd 
claim. For it seems that abduction, like deduction and induction, has to do 
                                                                                                                            
Fancy is a wilful imagination, a spontaneous act; fancy, a play as with dolls and puppets 
which we choose to call men and women; imagination, a perception and affirming of a real 
relation between a thought and some material fact. Fancy amuses; imagination expands and 
exalts us. Imagination uses an organic classification. Fancy joins by accidental 
resemblance, surprises and amuses the idle, but is silent in the presence of great passion and 
action. Fancy aggregates; imagination animates. Fancy is related to color; imagination to 
form. Fancy paints; imagination sculptures.» (R.W. Emerson, « Creativity and 
Imagination », Letters and Social Aims, Boston, Osgood, 1875). 
20
 Cf. R. Wollheim, Painting as an Art, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1987 ; 
R. Scruton, Art and Imagination, London, Methuen, 1974. 
21
 Cf. K. Walton, Mimesis as Make-believe, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1990. 
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with our intellectual powers, not with imagination. Nonetheless in the 
following parts of the paper I will explain this issue, as well as its role in the 
question about the structural link between imagination and improvisation. 
Imagination, I claimed, faces us with what is not present. In order to 
do that, it cannot proceed deductively, because what can be deduced is 
somehow already present and foreseen. In a deductive process, we simply 
make explicit what was implicit. Nothing must be properly invented. Hence, 
we may think that imagination works inductively. We work inductively 
when we collect single cases, generating from them a general rule. 
However, as for example Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Edmund Husserl 
objected to empiricism, the problem with induction is that we cannot know 
which the relevant cases are if we do not anticipate a rule that is not there, in 
virtue of which we are able to distinguish the relevant from the irrelevant 
cases
22
. An external confirmation of the outcomes of inductive reasoning is 
needed. However, there is a further possibility to be explored: imagination 
may proceed abductively
23
. 
According to Peirce, « abduction » is the way a rule is generated for 
interpreting a sign
24
 :
 
we use abduction when, moving from a single case, 
we anticipate (i.e. invent) the rule according to which we are judging it. In 
everyday life, but also in science and in art, « abductive reasoning is 
reasoning that forms and evaluates hypotheses in order to make sense of 
puzzling facts »
25
. According to organisational theorist Karl E. Weick,  
 
                                                 
22
 J. G. Fichte, Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (= GA), 
Hrsg. von R. Lauth et. al., Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Frommann-Holzboog, 1962-, II, 14, p. 
21 ; E. Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, Hamburg, Claassen & Goverts, 1948, III.II.d.  
23 
The difference between abduction and deduction is clearly described in J. R. Josephson 
& S. G. Josephson (eds.), Abductive Inference. Computation, Philosophy, Technology, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 10 : « The abduction transcends the 
information of its premises and generates new information that was not previously encoded 
there at all. This can be contrasted with deductions, which can be thought of as extracting, 
explicitly in their conclusions, information that was already implicitly contained in the 
premises. Deductions are truth preserving, whereas successful abductions may be said to be 
truth producing ». Good (i.e. reasonable, valid) inductive generalisations are here treated as 
cases of abduction (see p. 16). In other words generalisations by means of induction can be 
taken as valid and good, if a rule is projected, in virtue of which one can suppose which are 
the relevant cases. This rule cannot be acquired in an inductive way.  
24
 Cf. C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers, vol. 5, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1931, 
§§ 187-189. Cf. U. Eco, Semiotica e filosofia del linguaggio, Torino, Einaudi, 1983, pp. 40-
43.  
25
 K. E. Weick, « Faith, Evidence, and Action: Better Guesses in an Unknowable World », 
Organization Studies, 27, 11, 2006, pp. 1-14, here p.  9. 
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« (t)he basic idea is that when people imagine reality, they start 
with some tangible clue and then discover or invent a world in 
which that clue is meaningful. This act of invention is an act of 
divination. (…) The essence of conjecture and divination lies in the 
faith that a fragment is a meaningful symptom which, if pursued 
vigorously, will enact a world where the meaning of the fragment 
becomes clearer »
26
.  
 
Hence, in everyday experience, but also in science and in art, « when 
an observed fact is read through an imagined rule, this action can generate a 
world not previously thought of »
27
. 
 
IV. Imagination as Abductive Organization of Experience 
 
Abduction is in other words the reflective process in virtue of which 
meaning is generated, by means of supposing a way (« an imagined rule ») 
to perceive and understand something. The imagined rule is assumed as 
probably valid. Certainly, this kind of knowledge-producing inference is 
fallible and each time the validity of the abduction can be confirmed or 
rejected only in retrospect. « Nevertheless, by the aid of abductive 
inferences, knowledge is possible even in the face of uncertainty »
28
. 
Hence, using Kantian jargon one may say that the validity of a 
determinate judgement (which proceeds from universals to particulars) 
requires confirmation by a reflective judgement, which attempts to find 
universals for given particulars
29
. This holds both at the level of perception 
and at the level of cognition. 
                                                 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid. Weick elaborates on this point referring to a paper by N. Harrowitz: « Conjecture 
essentially utilizes “obscure or remote clues in a speculative manner to build an 
epistemological model”. Clues enable people to “leap from apparently significant facts, 
which could be observed, to a complex reality which – directly at least – could not. (…) 
The importance of the conjectural model is not found in the notion of reading coded signs 
such as imprints [animal footprints], but rather in the fact that the systems (…) were 
developed and invested with meaning through a process much like abduction. The rules 
were postulated to explain the observed facts. (…) As in abduction, a cultural or 
experiential knowledge is required to codify a system. Abduction is literally the 
groundwork necessary before a sign is codified.” ». The citations in the quotation are taken 
from N. Harrovitz, « The body of the detective model: Charles S. Peirce and Edgar Allan 
Poe », in U. Eco & T. A. Sebeok (eds). The Sign of Three: Dupin, Holmes, Peirce, 
Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1988, pp. 183-184. 
28
 Josephson & S. Josephson (eds.), op. cit., p. 13. 
29
 Cf. I. Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), Eng. Transl. Cambridge and New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 2000, Introduction, § iv. 
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With regard to perception, we may consider that, as has been 
explained especially by Merleau-Ponty, when we perceive an item we 
include in the horizon of our perception what we do not literally perceive. 
Although what we really see is for instance not a cube, but, say, a rhombus, 
we complete what we are seeing by means of projectively anticipating its 
whole image, and in this way we can see it as a cube
30
. 
As far as cognition is concerned, we may turn to Kant, according to 
whom imagination does not only mediate between a given concept (i.e. the 
general meaning) and the single cases of application of the general concept 
(intuition), as he explains in the Critique of Pure Reason
31
, but also 
anticipates the general meaning of a single item
32
 : as Heidegger would have 
said
33
, it is thus an « anticipatory projection » of a sense which is not given 
and determined
34
.  
Many aspects of this account of how imagination works as faculty or 
function of experience could be further discussed, but in this brief general 
outline I have simply aimed to prepare the terrain for what will be done in 
the next sections. So I will leave the matter at that and in the next section 
will rather pursue the following related question. Can we connect 
imagination to abduction also when imagination, as a vehicle of creativity, 
invents something which, allegedly, is not present and/or is not real as is the 
case in fiction and, more generally, in art?  
 
V. Imagination as an Abductive Process in the Arts 
                                                 
30
 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (1945), Engl. Transl. London & New 
York, Routledge, 2005, pp. 175, 235-237, 306-308. See S. Priest, Merleau-Ponty, London, 
Routledge, 1998, pp. 87-91. 
31
 Cf. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Eng. Transl. Cambridge, Cambridge University, 
1999, Book II, Chap. I. 
32
 This function of imagination is suggested in the Kant’s Critique of the Power of 
Judgment. 
33
 M. Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 24, 
Frankfurt a. M., Klostermann, 1975-, p. 364. 
34 
In this sense imagination involves time. Not only in the rather obvious sense that, as a 
human activity, its exercise requires time, i.e. that it develops in and through time. 
Imagination also involves time in the more fundamental sense that it is time considered 
from the standpoint of human experience. This is also the reason why Fichte claims that 
imagination sways between finiteness and infiniteness, i.e. from the (de)finite 
representation and its in(de)finite possible nuances, applications and transformations (cf. 
J.G. Fichte, Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, GA I/2 260). Today one would 
say: imagination sways between digital and analogical procedures (cf. S. Mahrenholz, 
Kreativität – Eine philosophische Analyse, Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 2011). The radical 
temporality of our experience implies that also the concepts that we generate and use (a 
Wittgensteinian would say: we generate by means of using) in a non-temporal way are 
prone to temporal flux. Identity is made up by, and exposed to, difference. 
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We might now ask whether the link between imagination and 
abduction can explain the creative process in art. I claim that it can at least 
in one particular and important sense: artworks are products of creative 
imagination. This should not be understood as committing us to something 
like the (nonsensical) claim that in art the inventions of the imagination are 
absolutely free. As a matter of fact, artists are not faced with unlimited 
possibilities for creative experimentation; they rather work within specific 
cultural horizons that feed, but also limit, their artistic creativity. Moreover, 
they also have to struggle against various kinds of difficulties and 
constraints concerning both practical issues (time, money and so on)
35
 and 
artistic problems (for example artists have to follow the rules of a genre in 
an original way)
36
. Certainly one of the most difficult tasks artists have to 
solve is dealing successfully with the media and the materials they are 
working with. In this regard, we can go back to the rather traditional idea
37
 
that artists do not know exactly how they can (and have to) produce their 
creations, before actually beginning their work. This seems to imply that a 
condition for artistic success is the ability to produce artworks while 
avoiding a total control over media, materials and working procedures. The 
point has been made in radical terms by the German abstract painter Willi 
Baumeister in the book Das Unbekannte in der Kunst (1947)
38
. Baumeister 
observed here that if artists knew how to create art, they could not create art. 
For authentic art is something creative and, by applying well-known 
methods of working artists could not really be creative, because they would 
simply repeat the already known. Hence, the value of artistic production 
partly depends on the emergence of objective forces, which artists cannot 
dominate, because they simply ignore them
39
. If this sounds too mysterious, 
                                                 
35
 Cf. H. Becker, Art Worlds, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982. 
36 
See J. Elster, Ulysses unbound. Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, chapter 3. On Elster’s book cf. G. 
Matteucci, « Creatività e sapere estetico », in L. Russo (ed.),  opo l’estetica, Palermo, 
Aesthetica Preprint, 2010, pp. 167-181. 
37
 In modern times this view of artistic creativity received serious philosophical 
consideration in Kant’s theory of genius and since Kant has been variously defended by 
important philosophers of art from different cultural traditions (such as F. W. J. Schelling, 
R. Collingwood and L. Pareyson) as well as by celebrated artists (like Francis Bacon and 
Picasso). 
38
 Stuttgart, Schwabe, 1947. 
39
 A similar point is made by C. Menke, Kraft. Ein Grundbegriff ästhetischer 
Anthropologie, Frankfurt a. M., Suhrkamp, 2008. Menke conceives artistic making as a 
kind of non-making, because artistic capacity (künstlerisches Können) is properly speaking 
incapacity (Nicht-Können). I thank Daniel Martin Feige for this suggestion. 
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we can make the same point in a more sober fashion. Artistic flair and 
inspiration is not simply imposed on the process of production; on the 
contrary, inspiration grows, as it were, through the process, thanks to the 
interaction with media and materials. Although many aspects of artistic 
practice can be learned, controlled, and technically mastered, artists cannot 
completely anticipate the aesthetic result of their creative endeavour by 
means of envisioning it in their mind
40
. This is due to the fact that artists 
cannot exactly foresee how their work will be evaluated by the public, by 
the critics or even by themselves, for each artist builds and develops herself 
through her artistic achievements. And it is also due to the fact that, as 
Merleau-Ponty once said, « thought and expression (…) are simultaneously 
constituted »
41
.  
This simultaneity seems to be particularly true for the artistic field : 
the power of imagination to present us with the absent, the unreal, or the 
unprecedented exercises its action by means of expressing itself in the 
dynamic interaction between the artists’ ideas and the concrete situations in 
which they are working. When artists are engaged in discovering or 
inventing the way to apply successfully their artistic techniques and ideas to 
the particular concrete situation in which they are in, they literally do not 
know what they are looking for. They act spontaneously, because, as Luigi 
Pareyson rightly pointed out
42
, upon the basis of a general and vague idea of 
how to produce their artworks (a kind of « forma formans ») they generate 
(tentatively) the precise norm, according to which they act – a norm which 
is valid for the single case and which coincides with the artwork (a « forma 
formata », according to Pareyson) –, while taking the specific situation in 
which they are involved and the media they use as affordance for creativity. 
In other words, they « invent a world », embodied in the artwork, in which 
particular materials, ideas, and situations become a meaningful affordance 
for aesthetic experience. 
Hence, as has been recently argued, a symptom of success in art 
production is that artists feel vis-à-vis the outcomes of their creativity the 
same surprise as other listeners and beholders
43
. Art, as a practice that 
                                                 
40
 This view is contrary to the so called  « ideal theory of art » defended by Benedetto 
Croce, Robin G. Collingwood, and Jean-Paul Sartre. 
41 
Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., p. 213. 
42 
Cf. L. Pareyson, Estetica. Teoria della formatività, Milano, Bompiani, 1988.  
43
 Cf. E. Huovinen, « On Attributing Artistic Creativity », Re-thinking Creativity I, special 
issue of Trópos: Journal of Hermeneutics and Philosophical Criticism, 4, 2, ed. by A. 
Bertinetto and A. Martinengo, 2011, pp. 65-86. 
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prompts valuable aesthetic experiences, is something unforeseeable and 
unpredictable. Therefore artists cannot plan the success of their artworks by 
following a recipe, in a kind of deductive way
44
. The process of art 
production seems rather to follow an abductive path : the creative path of 
imagination, by virtue of which, as Wittgenstein and Picasso rightly 
claimed, we can know what we were (imaginatively) looking for, only after 
having found it («Je ne cherche pas, je trouve »)
45
. 
 
VI. Abductive Imagination in Art Appreciation (the Artwork as 
Metaphor)  
 
We have explained what it means for artworks to be products of the 
creative imagination. However, this is not the only way imagination is at 
work in art. For artworks engage our capacity (sensibly and conceptually) to 
entertain things, persons, events, situations, etc., without needing to assert 
their existence. In other words, artworks engage the imagination of 
beholders, readers and listeners experiencing art. 
Again, the notion of abduction may turn out to be useful for 
explaining the appreciation of art as an experience that engages our 
imagination. For artworks should be considered as metaphors and 
metaphors are cases of abductive inferences. In what follows I will briefly 
try to explain this point. 
Even the most fantastic product of an artist’s imagination engages 
our capacity to grasp its significance, and undoubtedly in a playful way, as 
Kant would have said
46
. And when we assign some meaning or significance 
to what we are invited to imagine through and by the artwork, we search for 
a way of interpreting and understanding the imaged item. We manage to do 
this if we find ideas by virtue of which we are able to connect the fictional 
worlds offered by imagination to the ordinary world: in other words, we are 
in search of possibilities of understanding the artworks as vehicles of 
meanings, that connect the ordinary and the imaginary world. We succeed 
in this endeavour when we understand the imaginary world and the ordinary 
world through an often unconscious and implicit reciprocal comparison 
                                                 
44
 Bertinetto, « Performing the Unexpected », op. cit. 
45
 Cf. Matteucci, op. cit., pp. 178-179. 
46 
Cf. Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, op. cit., §. 9 See also R. Sonderegger, Für 
eine Ästhetik des Spiels – Hermeneutik, Dekonstruktion und der Eigensinn der Kunst, 
Frankfurt a. M., Suhrkamp, 2000. 
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between them
47
. The artworks, by virtue of which this creative connection is 
made, are therefore understood and used as metaphors. 
The main point I want to make in this regard is the following. The 
metaphorical use of imagination in experiencing artworks requires a kind of 
divination
48, which in turn engages the interpreter’s imagination in 
unforeseeable and surprising ways. For, in order to understand the fruits of 
artistic imagination, interpreters are required to adjust or re-direct 
imaginatively their categories and standards of judgement. 
The understanding of artworks requires the performance of the 
metaphors in which they consist, i.e. requires the establishment of links 
between the ordinary and the imaginary worlds. Those links are meanings 
that should be projectively anticipated by means of the interpreter’s 
imagination. In other words, metaphors work abductively
49
. The validity of 
the projected meanings is stated only hypothetically and interpreters can 
make sense of them only in retrospect, i.e. only relating the products of 
imagination to a referential context of set and shared meanings. This 
ordinary context of meanings helps interpreters to make sense of the 
imaginary worlds of the artworks and of the meanings they projectively 
assign to them, while, at the same time, the projected meanings 
retrospectively transform the referential context, in a continuous process of 
cognitive and interpretative feedback-loops. Hence, at least potentially, the 
significance of the results of imagination (the significance of artworks as 
metaphors and of the metaphors presented through artworks) is not simply 
added to the interpreter’s previous conceptual order. To grasp the outcomes 
of imagination, and also as a consequence of this grasping it, interpreters 
take a stance towards their previous conceptual order and re-set it.  
                                                 
47
 This is perhaps a way to understand what Novalis (Novalis, Philosophical Writings, 
trans. and ed. M. Mahony Stoljar, New York, SUNY Press, 1997, p. 60) says about the 
connection between romanticization and logarithmization: « By endowing the 
commonplace with a higher meaning, the ordinary with mysterious aspect, the known with 
the dignity of the unknown, the finite with the appearance of the infinite, I romanticize it.  
The operation for the higher, unknown, mystical, infinite is the reverse – this undergoes a 
logarithmic change through this connection – It takes on an ordinary form of expression ». 
48
 Here I use the term « divination » in Schleiermacher’s sense, according to which 
« divination » means « conjecture » or « guess ». It is the fundamental aspect of the process 
of comprehension of meaning that later Pierce will call « abduction ». Cf. F. D. E. 
Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik und Kritik, Frankfurt a. M., Suhrkamp, 1999. (However, the 
fact that I take divination in Schleiermacher’s sense does not commit me to accept 
Schleiermacher’s whole subjectivistic hermeneutics). 
49
 See B. Sörensen & T. Thellefsen, « Metaphor, concept formation, and esthetic semeiosis 
in a Peircean perspective », Semiotica, 161, 2006, pp. 199–212.  
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This is exactly what Gadamer means by writing, as I have already 
mentioned, that the experience of art changes those who experience it
50
. 
Successful art does not leave us indifferent, but gives rise to thought. 
However, that the imaginative experience of art goes beyond ordinary 
experience, while eliciting a reassessment of our conceptual and perceptual 
orders, does not mean that imaginative experience is irremediably detached 
from ordinary everyday experience. Even when imagination invites us to 
build fictional worlds or to see/and or hear « things » (that are not actually 
there) in the material surface that we are observing or in the sounds that we 
are hearing
51
, the extra-ordinary results of imagination, on which art thrives, 
are meaningful, that is, they become part of our ordinary experience : the 
way imagination exceeds our ordinary experience offers an intensification 
and/or an amplification of the way our ordinary perceptual and cognitive 
experience is organised in virtue of projective anticipations which can be 
understood (confirmed and verified, or maybe rejected or transformed) only 
retrospectively (only moving around the cube can I assure myself that what 
I have seen is a cube and not a rhombus). 
In § 4 we have seen that abduction, as anticipatory imagination, is 
the way meaning is generated in everyday practices. From this ensues that 
in human practices rules and/or meanings cannot always be applied in every 
situation without loss of identity; in principle the normative identity of the 
rule (i.e. of the meanings, of concepts) is abductively, and tentatively, 
generated in and by the process of its application. Since concepts are formed 
abductively, it is not at odds to claim that new cognitions occur in virtue of 
metaphors. 
Therefore, art is not absolutely opposed to everyday experience. In 
this particular respect, in art metaphors work the same way as concepts are 
shaped in everyday life and in science. So the art experience, both from the 
perspective of production and from the perspective of appreciation, 
embodies, develops, and makes somehow explicit the abductive working of 
imagination in ordinary and everyday experiences. In improvisation this is 
particularly clear, as I will argue in the next section. 
 
 
 
                                                 
50
 In other words, this transformation is the authentic experience of art. See D. M. Feige, 
Kunst als Salvstverständigung, Münster, Mentis, 2012,  pp. 110-138. 
51
 In this sense Surrealism is only the most evident instance of a process that is at work in 
every art practice. 
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VII. Improvisation, Imagination, Abduction 
 
Everything I have said so far about imagination and the art 
experience deserves much more clarification. However, it will suffice for 
showing the structural affinity between imagination and improvisation. 
Such an affinity depends, I argue, upon the fact that both share the same 
way of operating : abduction.  
According to the anthropologist Tim Ingold abduction and 
improvisation are two opposite models of creating
52
. According to the 
abductive model, Ingold claims, the creativity of actions is judged by the 
novelty of its outcomes by comparison with what has gone before and then 
traced to the antecedent conditions in the form of unprecedented ideas in the 
mind of individual agents. Conversely, according to the improvisation 
model, we do not connect a creative outcome to a previously projected idea, 
but create while performing. 
The problem with this view is that both models are falsely described. 
On the one hand, what Ingold calls the abductive model is rather a kind of 
deductive model. It is not an abductive model because, as we have seen in § 
4, in abduction the imagined general idea is only anticipatively supposed as 
valid; it is not taken as definite and certain before its application. On the 
other hand, the improvisational model – creating while performing – does 
not exclude the possibility that, while performing, we connect what we are 
doing with previously formed ideas. Rather our imagination evolves while 
working in an on-going process of transformation. 
As we have previously seen (in § 5), this is to be sure a feature of 
artistic production in general. Yet, only improvisational practices properly 
so-called display this on-going process of (at least potential) transformation 
on the spot. However, the important thing is that improvisation does not rule 
out abduction, i.e. evaluation of an item according to a rule which is not 
given, but only supposed as valid. On the contrary, improvisation, like 
imagination, works in an abductive way, because it applies norms that still 
do not exist – but that are generated in the praxis, in a metaphorical way – 
for making sense of the concrete and unrepeatable situation of its 
realisation
53
. It generates normativity out of single cases. In this sense, it 
                                                 
52
 Cf. http ://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/creativity-lecture-3-creativity-abduction-or-improvisation-
video. 
53
 This performative generation of normativity is philosophically developed by L. 
Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations, Oxford, Blackwell, 1953) and J. Derrida 
(« Signature Event Context », in Margins of Philosophy, Chicago, University of Chicago 
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performs in real-time what artists do when they use imagination for 
producing artworks. Let’s examine the issue a bit more closely. 
 
VIII. Improvisation in Everyday Practice 
 
Improvisation is typically a kind of making something without 
previously knowing what to do, i.e. by imaginatively anticipating the 
unknown, which nonetheless remains unpredictable. Hence, one can 
properly see what really was in the running only in retrospect. 
We may firstly consider improvisation in everyday practice. In 
everyday practices we are sometimes involved in situations in which we 
have to act rapidly, in spite of lacking information or means that would 
otherwise be required. In such cases we lack the possibility of weighing up 
carefully and accurately, by means of comparison, the best way to act, 
consciously considering the possible consequences of our actions, and of 
projecting a plan of action that we can put into practice at a later stage. Our 
success depends on the ability to find in a moment a structure in chaos, 
discovering or inventing a way of proceeding by means of spontaneously 
performing it, and seeing if it works. In particular, in everyday practices 
improvisation may have the three following common meanings: 
* «The process of “making do”, or coping with some activity, using 
minimal resources. For example, provisionally replacing a broken car fan 
belt using nylon stockings. » In this sense improvisation has the connotation 
of being imperfect (and, sometimes, only partially adequate). 
* «The process of producing quality results using inferior materials : 
for example, turning old discarded clothing into new fashions, or producing 
a gourmet meal using leftovers. » 
* «The process of adjusting to the occurrences around oneself while 
working at a particular activity; of being receptive to the world around 
oneself, and using knowledge of that world (…) to adapt to change. » 
Hence, generally speaking, in everyday practices an agent 
improvises when she « uses the limited experience and resources at (her) 
disposal to carry out an activity in a (usually) time-bounded situation. »
54
 
                                                                                                                            
Press, 1982). 
54
 All above quotations are from J. E. Anderson, Constraint-Directed Improvisation for 
Everyday Activities, Doctoral Thesis, University of Manitoba, 1995, p. 93. On 
improvisation and the everyday see also L. Goehr, « Der Agon des Improvisierens – auf 
Gerissenen Saiten. Zu einer Theorie von Passung und Witz », in F. Döhl, D. M. Feige, T. 
Hilgers & F. McGovern (eds.), Konturen des Kunstwerks. Zur Frage von Relevanz und 
Kontingenz, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München, 2013. 
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There is no pre-established rule as to how to solve problems in a 
spontaneous way, because each situation calls for different solutions (even 
though one can improve by practice the capacity to act and react 
spontaneously in a satisfactory way in a given sphere of experience). Rather 
we intuitively focus on the situation we are in and rapidly imagine and 
perform a way to solve the emergency situation, without having the right 
means or time to analyse the facts and the data at our disposal and to reflect 
about the validity of the imagined solution. In other words, when we react, 
on the basis of our previous experience, to unforeseen circumstances, we 
have sometimes not even conceptualised explicitly what the problem is 
exactly we must solve; we act while applying what psychologists call the « 
adaptive unconscious »
55
 and one may say that the solution to the problem is 
that which afterwards enables us to see what was the specific problem we 
were faced with. The ability to judge, which is the real problem at issue, is 
in other words part of the improvised solution to the problem; therefore, we 
can consciously understand what the problem was only in retrospect. The 
effectiveness of the solution performed enabled us to understand 
retrospectively that we had rightly imagined the link between the emergency 
situation and the problem-solution chain. 
Obviously every domain of human practice allows for different 
degrees of improvisation. Nonetheless, « even in a very structured domain 
[like chess, airplane piloting, or medicine] where high quality results are 
demanded, improvisation is performed to some degree »
56
. The instrumental 
quality for which improvisation is required, and valued, in human activities 
is its flexibility, i.e. its ability to adapt to circumstances. However, the 
frugal, quick, economical way we cope with such emergency situations in 
virtue of individuating the right problem while performing a (more or less) 
satisfactory solution can also be aesthetically valuable both from the 
subjective standpoint of the agents and from the objective standpoint of the 
results of the performed action: it is so when the lack or inadequacy of a 
previous standard action plan, rather than being detrimental, increases both 
the effectiveness of the action and the qualities (such as elegance, sharpness, 
courage, boldness, control curiosity, organicity) of the performing agents, 
actions performed and results thereof, and/or when the solution offered 
                                                 
55
 Cf. M. Gladwell, Blink. The Power of Thinking Without Thinking, Little, Brown, Back 
Bay Book, 2005, p. 11. 
56 
Anderson, op. cit., p. 94. 
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enlightens creatively a previously unknown problematic field
57
. In this sense 
we can speak about an aesthetics of improvisation in practical life. It regards 
our capacity to act without following a prepared plan and by using found 
materials, performing actions that establish the nature of the problem that 
they themselves resolve, in ways that are satisfying not only instrumentally, 
but also for their own sake
58
. 
In these improvisatory practices the (partly unconscious) imaginative 
and decisional process does not completely precede the performative 
gesture. Imaginative anticipations and operative decisions (and re-decisions) 
are part of the performance and are shown in the performance. Conversely, 
the performative gesture is the way we invent – imaginatively, albeit also 
concretely – the solution to a problem that is envisioned through the 
solution : in other words improvisation in everyday practice proceeds in an 
abductive manner. 
This is also what happens in improvisational artistic practices, which 
thrive and elaborate on the aesthetics of improvisation in everyday practices. 
 
IX. Imagination and Improvisation in Performing Arts 
 
It will therefore be useful to discuss the dynamics of the interaction 
between imagination and improvisation in the performing arts. 
A) Firstly, imagination contributes to the performative organisation, 
construction, evaluation, and interpretation (one may use the German 
concept of Gestaltung to encompass all this) of the improvisational event. 
Here, like in the construction and interpretation of our ordinary experience 
of reality, organisational imagination is at work. 
B) Secondly, imagination is a vehicle of artistic creativity and – 
together with many other aesthetic qualities, such as virtuosity, style, 
coordination, to name but a few – it is partly responsible for the aesthetic 
and artistic value of the improvisational performance, when the spontaneous 
achievements of improvisation not only go beyond expected and common 
results, but the way they are innovative and unexpected is also highly 
valuable aesthetically and artistically, in virtue of their formal and structural 
                                                 
57
 For a discussion concerning the value of ingenuity cf. C. Dowling, « The Value of 
Ingenuity », in Re-thinking Creativity I, pp. 47-63. 
58 
Scrapyard challenges (or, as they are also called, junkyard wars) are competitions that 
artistify, as it were, precisely this ability to improvise for coping with a difficult and 
unforeseen situation. Cf. G. Peters, The Philosophy of Improvisation, Chicago and London, 
The University of Chicago Press, 2009, pp. 9-19. 
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qualities (like elegance, dynamism, boldness, coherence in complexity, etc.) 
or of their metaphorical and expressive significance. 
C) Thirdly, improvisational performances set audience imagination 
in motion in order to grasp the shape that the performance is taking while 
the performance is going on as well as its artistic and aesthetic significance. 
 
X. Imagination and the improvisational process 
 
In the construction of an improvised dance, music, or theatre 
performance a complex network of reciprocal feedback-loops among action, 
imagination, evaluation, and acknowledgement is set in motion
59
. 
In dance, music, or theatre improvisation the meaning and the value 
of every moment of the performance depends on, and is loaded with (the 
recollection of) past and (the expectation of) future moments. The identity, 
the meaning, the function and the value of every single piece of the whole 
performance (movement, sound, gesture, action, figure, and the like) is not 
definitive before the process, but depends upon the network of references 
                                                 
59
 Regarding theatre improvisation see K. Johnstone, op. cit ; A. Cafaro, L’improvvisazione 
dell’attore nel teatro di ricerca contemporaneo. Tra determinismo e aleatorietà, Ravenna, 
Longo Editore, 2009. For dance see Y. Nakano and O. Takeshi, « Process of 
Improvisational Contemporary Dance », and F. Lampert, « Kommunikation in der 
Gruppenimprovisation. Zur verschlüsselten Verständigung beim Ballett Freiburg Pretty 
ugly », in A. Klinge & M. Leeker (eds.), Tanz Kommunikation Praxis, Muenster, Lit, 2003, 
pp. 77-90. For musical improvisation see : J. Pressing, « Cognitive Processes in 
Improvisation », in W. R. Crozier & A. J. Chapman (eds.), Cognitive Processes in the 
Perception of Art, Amsterdam, 1984, pp. 345-363 ; « The Micro- and Macrostructural 
Design of Improvised Music », Music Perception: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 5, 2, 1987, 
pp. 133-172 ; « Improvisation : Methods and Models », in J. Sloboda (ed.), Generative 
Processes in Music, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987 ; E. Sarath, « A New Look at 
Improvisation », Journal of Music Theory, 40, 1996, pp. 1-38;  V. Caporaletti, I processi 
improvvisativi nella musica - Un approccio globale, Lucca, Lim, 2005 ; B. Nettle & G. 
Solis (eds.), Musical Improvisation. Art, Education, Society, Urbana & Chicago, University 
of Illinois Press, 2009 ; G. Ferreccio & D. Racca (ed.), L’improvvisazione in musica e 
letteratura, Torino, L’Harmattan Italia, 2007. In particular regarding jazz improvisation see 
I. Monson, Saying Something. Jazz improvisation and Interaction, Chicago, The University 
of Chicago Press, 1996 ; E. Jost, « Über Jazzimprovisation », in R. Brinkmann (ed.), 
Improvisation und Neue Musik, Mainz, 1979, pp.  55-63 ; P. N. Johnson Laird, « How Jazz 
Musicians Improvise », Music Perception, 19, 3, 2002, pp. 415-442 ; V. Caporaletti, La 
definizione dello swing. I fondamenti estetici del jazz e delle musiche audiotattili, Teramo, 
Ideasuoni, 2000 ; Sparti, Suoni inauditi, op. cit. ; Santi, op. cit. ; P. Berliner, Thinking in 
Jazz. The Infinite Art of Improvisation, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1994 ; 
R. G. O’ Meally et al. (eds.), Uptown conversation. The New Jazz Studies, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 2004, pp. 393-403 ; R. Kraut, « Why Does Jazz Matter to 
Aesthetic Theory? », The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 63, 2005, pp. 3-15; A. 
Bertinetto, « Reflexive Prozesse bei der Jazzimprovisation», in G. Bertram, D. M. Feige & 
F. Ruda (eds.), Sinnliche Reflexivität.  ur sinnlichen  imension der   nste, Berlin, 
Diaphanes, forthcoming. 
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that is being woven in the course of performance. Every action and gesture 
interacts with the meaning of previous actions and gestures, defining and 
modifying them, so that every past moment or sign may change its meaning 
depending on what will happen later. At the same time, every act and 
gesture shapes anticipatively the meaning of future acts and gestures. 
Hence, the identity of the meaning of the performance is in flux, because the 
referential context of the performance is continuously re-created in the 
course of the performance
60
 and every situational moment acquires its 
meaning and, reciprocally, contributes to the meaning of the whole process, 
in the course of performance
61
. The sense of the whole process is 
established only at the end of the process. However, since every 
performance is not an isolated atom, but a stage in the history of a personal 
and/or collective artistic practice, there is, as it were, no end to the process. 
Every performance is (in different ways: conformist, evolutionist, 
revolutionary, etc.) a continuation of the previous ones. Therefore, based 
upon their previous experience as well as upon the knowledge of references 
of some kind (aesthetic styles, historical contexts, artistic genres, artistic 
rules, chord progressions or narrative plots, but even embodied patterns and 
learned gestures, and so on) performers (and audience too) surely have some 
expectation of what is happening in a certain performance, what will 
happen, and how. In some artistic genres performers are expected to direct 
their improvisations along more rigid tracks than in other genres; moreover 
in each performing practice some parameters of reference are more stable 
and foreseeable than others. For example, in Bebop musical improvisations 
the general harmonic structure is more fixed than in Free Jazz : so 
expectations regarding harmonic development are generally stronger in 
Bebop than in Free Jazz; but one can expect that in a Bebop performance 
the melodic lines will be more elaborated than in a Free Jazz performance. 
This will probably focus more intensively on the « energy » of the musical 
interaction. 
To put it briefly, improvisers have at their disposal some explicit and 
implicit perceptual and conceptual schemes in virtue of which they can 
                                                 
60
 Using the language of system theory one can say that the system develops its own 
borders. See N. Luhmann. Soziale Systeme : Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie, Frankfurt 
a.M., Suhrkamp, 1984, Eng. Translation, Social Systems, Stanford, Stanford University 
Press, 1995. 
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Sparti, Suoni inauditi, op. cit. p. 165. See G. Bertram, « Kreativität und Normativität », 
in G. Abel (ed.), Kreativität, Universitätsverlag der TU Berlin, vol. 1, pp. 273-283 ; G. 
Bertram : « Improvisation und Normativität », in G. Brandstetter, H.-F. Bormann & A. 
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understand (more or less) what is going on and, consequently, they are able 
to evaluate what they themselves and their fellow performers are doing. 
This continuous evaluation has performative power
62
, because it guides the 
decisions that are taken and re-taken (often unconsciously) and drive the 
performance forward.  
In interactive improvisation performers need to solve coordination 
problems by means of common referents and, especially (due to the fact that 
common referents may be absent or too weak) by means of searching for « 
focal points » through the anticipation of others’ performing decisions63. 
Focal points
64
 – which can be both discovered and created – should make 
performers able to disambiguate the rules of selection according to their 
artistic competence and to establish successive identities and stable points in 
the performance stream.  
It is true that the coordination itself between performers « probably 
depends on the existence of a shared representation of the ongoing situation 
»
65
. Still, even when they share a common cultural, artistic, and stylistic 
background, performers cannot know at a given moment (at least in any 
detail) what will happen some moments later; they cannot know whether 
their present representation and evaluation of the ongoing situation will still 
be valid some moments later. They do not know exactly how their gestures 
will be acknowledged and evaluated by their fellow performers (or by the 
audience). For the referential frame that guides performers’ and audience 
expectations and sets norms for the meaning of what is happening, is not 
stable and static. It is rather dynamic and changes (or may change) during 
the performance: in fact it emerges during the performance beyond the 
performers’ subjective intentions66. So, relying on the representation of the 
                                                 
62 
Nachmanovitch, op. cit., p. 134. 
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 Cf. C. Canonne, « Focal points in Collective Free Improvisation », Perspectives of New 
Music (forthcoming). 
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 «A focal point is (…) a point of convergence for expectations; and it arises because 
players are trying somehow to single out one of the solutions ». (Canonne, op. cit., p. 3 of 
the manuscript). 
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C. Canonne & N. Garnier, « Cognition and Segmentation in Collective Free 
Improvisation », Proceedings International Conference on Music Perception and 
Cognition, 2012, p. 198. Regarding dance improvisation F. Lampert (« Kommunikation in 
der Gruppenimprovisation ») calls the focal points « catalyzing agents ». 
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 In reference to theatre improvisation R.K. Sawyer (Improvised Dialogues : Emergence 
and Creativity in Conversation, Westport/London, Ablex, 2003, pp. 41-43) highlights the 
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ongoing situation, performers can only suppose what is probably the best 
way to react in the present situation. However, they cannot really know in 
advance how what follows will modify both the sense of what they have 
already done and of what they are doing now as well as of the mental 
representation thereof. Performers can « anticipatively project » an 
expectation concerning both the meaning of the present moment of the 
performance and what will emerge later : they continuously suppose or 
imagine a sense that is both a meaning and a direction) of the performance. 
What each single performer does is guided by this anticipatory imagination, 
which is more or less collectively and interactively shaped and shared. 
However, this anticipatory imagination may go frustrated, because each 
moment of the performance is not really foreseeable : nobody knows 
whether the sense of the performance they are imagining – which is 
expressed in what they are doing – will be confirmed, modified or rejected 
and at every single temporal step of the performance reality outshines 
prevision, provisional conjectures, and imagination. 
Since performers do not follow a rigid plan, but – at least to a certain 
degree – invent on the spot what they do, every actual event in the course of 
the artistic performance is per se unforeseen and, at least from their fellow 
performers’ standpoints, accidental : it is an emergent accomplishment that 
reflexively and recursively feeds back the imaginative projection of the 
course of the performance, that is, the live (self-)construction of 
normativity. At each step of the process, in every single instant, performers 
(should) search for, imagine, and anticipate a norm for making sense of the 
process as emergent accomplishment. This norm is a projection, a regulative 
ideal in the Kantian sense : as an actual and real rule is generated through 
each of the different emergent accomplishments in which, as an ideal 
imagined and projective norm, it is applied. Therefore, the undeducible and 
emergent, thus unexpected (or better : expected as unexpected), application 
of the rule precedes the rule, because the rule is paradoxically generated 
through and by its application(s). In other words, the actual and real rule is 
the performance itself, which as emergent accomplishment is perceived, 
understood and evaluated thanks to norms that are not pre-given, because 
they are generated throughout the course of performance. In this sense, 
                                                                                                                            
meaning of his or her own turn until the other actors have responded. (…) In improvised 
dialogues, many actions do not receive their full meaning until after the act has occurred; 
the complete meaning of a turn is dependent on the flow of the subsequent dialogue ». See 
also Bertram, « Improvisation und Normativität », op. cit. and E. Landgraf, « Eine wirklich 
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improvised performances are cases of performative abduction. The 
normative evaluation of the process by virtue of an ideal and projected norm 
influences the reality of the process, the actual construction of a real norm, 
and vice versa the reality of the process continuously re-regulates its 
meanings and values.  
 
11. Imagination and the question concerning the artistic value of 
improvisation 
 
One may ask whether and how the improvisational nature of a 
performance concerns its artistic and aesthetic meaning and value. One can 
indeed be sceptical about the real artistic import of improvisational 
practices. Although, as we have previously seen (§ 8), even improvisation in 
everyday practices may be aesthetically, and not only instrumentally, 
valuable, this is not a sufficient reason for praising improvisation in art 
practices. For we can certainly be satisfied by improvised solutions in 
everyday activities, yet this seems not to be the case in the realm of art. In 
the realm of art we look for excellence and we cannot be pleased by 
mediocre or partial results, no matter how flexible we might be. Art requires 
perfection and, one may argue, one can be aesthetically and artistically 
pleased by improvised « art » like scrapyard wars only if one has poor taste.  
In other words, the general objection against the artistic value of 
improvisation may be split into two parts. One may firstly object that in and 
with improvisation aesthetic and artistic perfection cannot be reached, 
because performers have to cope with the accidents of reality, agreeing to 
make compromise with the actual circumstances. Secondly, one may further 
contend that the impossibility of perfection in improvisation is due to the 
fact that in improvisation creative imagination is weak and cannot play a 
great enough role to generate creatively valuable artistic performances. If 
imagination in an improvised performance does only the same amount of 
work as in the organisation of everyday experience, then it seems that 
imagination is not particularly important for the artistic and aesthetic 
features and values of improvisation in the performing arts. 
The first part of the objection against improvisation in art is 
mistaken, because it depends upon a wrong (or at least partial) notion of 
perfection as formal completeness in accordance with a structured order. 
Arguing that improvisation needs a special « aesthetics of imperfection » (as 
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a lot of scholars do
67
) does not help. The problem with this view is rather 
that in art and aesthetics perfection should not simply be understood in these 
formalistic terms, because compliance with an established structured order 
is not always the right criterion for artistic value : the criteria of success in 
art and aesthetic experience are renegotiated in and through each particular 
situation. Hence, since in improvisation the rule is invented while it is 
performed in a particular and unrepeatable circumstance, improvisation 
seems to be a paradigmatic case of the art experience, rather than exemplary 
of an aesthetic of imperfection. However, as I have already discussed this 
point elsewhere
68
, I will here leave the matter at that and switch to the 
second part of the objection. In this regard I will make two related points. 
(i). In artistic improvisation, I have observed, the reality of the 
performance exceeds the simple possibility of a structured imaged plan. 
Each moment of the performance forges, to a certain extent, its own 
normative context. The sense of the performance imagined by performers 
and audience cannot resist the surprising emergence of reality. Therefore, it 
may even be argued that imagination and improvisation are not compatible 
at the ontological level. The argument could go as follows. Imagination is a 
projective anticipation of a content of experience, which is not present. But, 
if we anticipate something, then – so it seems, at least – we foresee that 
something. Hence, while performing what we have imaginatively 
anticipated, we are not improvising. So, we cannot imagine what we 
improvise, because, while improvising, we are not performing something 
that we knew already in the past, even if the kind of « knowledge » we are 
referring to is only an imagined one, that is a conjectural anticipation. 
However, this is a wrong way of reasoning. During the performance, 
the imaginative anticipation of the course of the performance and the actual 
course of the performance tend to merge into each other. The projective 
anticipation is not fixed but changes in function of the actual development 
of the performance. As we have seen, there are continuous feedback loops 
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 Cf. T. Gioia, The Imperfect Art. Reflections on Jazz and Modern Culture, Oxford, 
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A. Bertinetto, « Improvvisazione e formatività », Annuario filosofico, 25, 2009, pp. 145-
174; Bertinetto, « Performing the Unexpected », op. cit.; A. Bertinetto, « Jazz als 
Gelungene performance. Ästhetische Normativität und Improvisation », Zeitschrift für 
Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, forthcoming. 
 Klesis – Revue philosophique – 28 : 2013 – Imagination et performativité 
 
 
 87 
between emerging situations in the performance and their normative 
significance. Therefore, it is not true that performers have no imagination or 
plans concerning the performance; but what performers imagine, plan and 
decide during the performance is influenced by the performance itself. 
Hence, projective imagination is not ontologically prevented by artistic 
improvisation, it rather moves along with the improvised performance. 
Moreover, the imagination involved in artistic improvisation is not 
exclusively a conscious exercise of the performers’ private minds. It is 
embodied in the public gestures of the performers, who shape what they are 
imagining while communicating it in their artistic expressions. In other 
words, in improvisation the use of imagination is not an exclusive exercise 
of mind control over the performer’s own body and over the artistic media 
(sounds, gestures, speech, movements, and the like). The performer’s 
imaginative power reacts to what is going on now, and feeds itself not only 
with performing possibilities inherited from past experience, but also with 
possibilities emerging from the interaction with the situation in real-time. 
Performers, in other words, envision how and where to go on in the 
performance by means of doing. And their doing is not exclusively mind-
controlled, it is not under the control of the single performers’ minds but 
rather open to multiple influences within the collective performance
69
. 
Imaginative ideation and interactive performance largely coincide. 
(ii). One may, however, take an Adornian stance toward 
improvisation and judge it as aesthetically or artistically feeble on the 
premise that improvisation is an obstacle to, rather than a vehicle or a source 
for, artistic creativity. The core of Adorno’s general criticism toward the 
artistic value of jazz is that in jazz improvisation is not creative, because 
improvisers refer to established and shared contexts of expectations by 
recourse to standardised stereotypes and to normalised and fixed structures 
that are simply repeated again and again. So what is passed off as « 
spontaneity » is really only the boring and conventional repetition of the 
same
70
. Hence, it does not subvert the existent, but re-affirms it by means of 
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 For creativity in group improvisation see R.K., Sawyer, Group Creativity : Music, 
Theater, Collaboration, New York, Taylor & Francis, 2003; Bertram, « Improvisation und 
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the repetition of standard commonplaces. In other words, improvisers are 
not, and cannot be, creatively imaginative. 
The literature has already explained that the « music Adorno knew 
as jazz at the time he produced his principal work on the subject (. . .) was 
the popular dance music produced in the waning years of the Weimar 
Republic [1919-1933] and also in England (. . . and) had everything to do 
with salon music and the military march [. . .] and very little to do with non-
swing American jazz and even less with African-American musics »
71
. 
Moreover, the criteria Adorno applied in order to judge this kind of jazz as 
stereotypical (« individualization, escape from normalization, pioneer 
artisanship, anti-standardization, un-delimited aesthetics, spontaneity, 
freedom from constraints, inexhaustible possibility »
72
) are also 
stereotypical. Yet, the main point against Adorno’s rejection of 
improvisation is that the fact that artistic improvisations can artistically fail 
does not prevent them from being (at least potentially) artistically 
successful. In this regard improvisational arts do not differ from other art 
forms. Imagination plays in this an important role. 
Adorno is certainly right in saying that the sheer fact that one 
improvises is no warrant for the artistic quality of a performance. Indeed, 
not every improvisation is inventive and/or expressive in a valuable artistic 
way. It is trivial to observe that improvised performances, like any kind of 
artistic performance, may be bad performances. Moreover, needless to say, 
a performance may be improvised in the pejorative sense of the word and 
precisely for this reason not reach the standards of quality required in the 
artistic practice and genre at issue. Not only that. Even though the 
performance is well organised, the contribution of imagination to the 
organisation of the improvised performance does not imply, per se, the 
artistic success of the performance. Even if, thanks partly to the 
anticipations provided by their organisational imagination, performers 
succeed in producing a coherent performance, this is not a sufficient 
condition for achieving valuable aesthetic and artistic results. As a matter of 
fact, as with other artistic practices, the performance’s lack of quality can be 
partly due to a scarce, or bad, exercise of the creative power of imagination, 
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i.e. to an incapacity to imagine valuable artistic possibilities for improvised 
performances. Indeed, besides contributing to the arrangement and the 
organisation of an improvised performance by means of its projective 
anticipations, imagination should guide the improvisational process in 
creative, inventive and expressive ways, otherwise the performance will 
hardly have great artistic and aesthetic merit. However, pace Adorno, 
improvisation is not an obstacle to creative imagination.  
The distinctive trait of improvised artistic performances is rather that 
both the organisational and the creative imagination are (or at least can and 
should be) exercised to a certain extent during the course of the 
performance, in order to produce the performance. Like organisational 
imagination, that is responsible for the coherence of the performance, 
creative imagination too is a necessary condition, i.e. a prerequisite, for the 
success of improvisation and it is particularly important for the achievement 
of its artistic qualities. As Tom Nunn put it in his book Wisdom of the 
Impulse. The Nature of Free Improvisation
73
, « [w]ithout [creative] 
Imagination, a free improvisation cannot “move forward”, there are no ideas 
and no progression of meaning. Nothing is quite as boring as a free 
improvisation without [creative] Imagination! ». In this sense, to claim that 
improvisation (in Nunn’s own words : « Free improvisation ») « is the 
imagination unleashed through impulse »
74
 is not an exaggeration. 
 
12. Performing imagination : the aesthetic merit of improvisation 
 
One could argue that, at least in the way I have presented them here, 
organisational imagination and creative imagination are individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for artistic improvisation. 
Without organisational imagination improvisation could hardly achieve 
coherence and the performance could hardly be followed either by the 
performers or the audience. Without creative imagination the coherence 
achieved through organisational improvisation would lack originality, 
inventive force, expressivity, and other aesthetic qualities that are required 
for art to be valuable and authentic. I do not contend this point; it seems to 
be a nice way to explain the kind of work imagination does in art (see §§ 4-
6). However, creativity is an evaluative concept. Therefore, the formula « 
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organisational imagination + creative imagination = art » cannot be rightly 
conceived as a recipe for artistic success. Analogously, it would be a 
mistake to understand the more specific formula « performative 
organisational imagination + performative creative imagination = artistic 
improvisation » as a recipe for valuable improvised performances. Rather, 
we can judge an artwork and also an improvised performance as successful 
and creative only in retrospect, i.e. after the event is done. This is due, in 
turn, to the fact that artworks set, in the abductive way previously explained 
(§§ 5-6), the criteria for the assessment of their own artistic merit. 
Improvised artistic performances are not exceptions to this rule and they 
rather enact and exemplarily show this generation of aesthetic normativity 
in the course of performance
75
. 
The role of imagination as anticipatory projection of the improvised 
performance during the performance has already been explained (in § 10). 
Imagination is in this sense a condition of the organisation of the 
performance in real-time. However, as discussed in §§ 5-6, in art 
imagination is not only a necessary condition for the organisation of the 
experience, but also vehicle and source of artistic creativity. We have just 
clarified the point that improvisation is no exception to this general rule. 
Yet, differently from other art practices, in improvisation the inventions of 
imagination are immediately realised, exhibited and evaluated during the 
performance. Improvisation is, in this sense, imagination at work, 
performing imagination, i.e. imagination producing its inventions 
immediately. 
Obviously, this does not mean that the way improvisers take 
advantage of their imagination on the spot is completely unprepared. Like in 
other human practices, « imagination cannot happen in a vacuum; it requires 
material to work with in order to generate ideas. There often has to be a 
problem to solve. Or it may simply be a creative response to an emotion »
76
. 
Moreover, improvisers perform their imaginative capacity in interaction 
with other performers, with the environment, with the emotional atmosphere 
of the particular situation in which they are involved. Imagination works 
here as a formative force that comes from a cultural background, but 
articulates itself in interaction with the specific situation of the performance. 
Therefore it is exposed to an unpredictable number of possible perceptual 
and contextual influences that can shape the artistic performance, if allowed 
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to do so
77
. 
Nonetheless, the most important question is yet another one : what, 
besides its real-time character, is specific to imagination as a creative and 
formative force in improvisational artistic practices? This question may 
receive psychological answers. Here, anyway, I am not concerned with this 
kind of answer (the importance of which I do not deny). The answer we 
need here is an aesthetic one. We need to understand what is the 
contribution of imagination to the specific aesthetic value of improvisation 
as an artistic practice. In other words we must distinguish the value of 
imagination for everyday improvisational practice and for art in general 
from the specific value of imagination for artistic improvisation. The answer 
I suggest goes as follows. 
As I observed in § 8, in everyday practices improvisation may be a 
valid way to act. Imagination does not have primarily aesthetic functions 
here, but serves as a tool for rapidly envisioning the emergency situation 
and finding a valid solution on the spot. The improvised action can be 
aesthetically valuable – in different ways and to different degrees. Yet 
aesthetic success is not the main purpose of the action performed. In artistic 
improvisation imagination is from the beginning set in motion for aesthetic 
and artistic aims and not only for grasping and solving an emergency 
situation. The improvisation we meet in art is not simply the kind of practice 
to which we resort when we have no other choice. In other words, in art 
improvisation does not have primarily instrumental functions. 
Improvisation, in art, is a means for imaginatively inventing and producing 
creative and valuable artistic productions. 
How then does the contribution of imagination in artistic 
improvisation differ from other artistic ways of production? Obviously 
enough, in dance, music and theatre improvisation at least part of the 
imaginative work responsible for the artistic invention is done in real-time, 
i.e. while the artwork is being created and exhibited. But this is not enough 
to understand the specific value and scope of imagination in improvisational 
art. Why is this real-time character of the exercise of improvisation 
artistically and aesthetically meaningful? I think the following is a possible 
line of answer. Improvisation shows the creative work of imagination, 
where imagination is working within a specific and unrepeatable situation. 
This can result in artistic outcomes that are all the more valuable as they are 
unpredictable and surprising, because dependent on the ingenious way 
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creative imagination thrives in emergency circumstances. Moreover, in the 
case of group performances, imagination is also not a private business, but 
an interactive practice according to which the artistic outcome is the product 
of the negotiation of each performer’s private imagination, because the 
creative outcomes of the performers’ imagination affect the imaginative 
creativity of their fellow performers. To perceive imagination at work, both 
in the soloist and in the interactive variation, is indeed aesthetically highly 
satisfying, especially for competent audiences, that are able to grasp 
immediately the moves made by performers on the spot. In a nutshell, a big 
part of the aesthetic merit of artistic improvisation lies in the way 
performers and audience perceive live, maybe feel, how imagination works 
in unforeseeable ways as a vehicle for artistic creativity in performances in 
which the coincidence between invention and realisation in a specific 
situation implies the unrepeatability and the exceptional nature of the artistic 
event that is happening now. 
This epitomises the way art experience, as such, stands out from 
ordinary experiences. It cannot be completely planned and anticipated in 
advance and its evaluation and understanding both require and produce a 
metaphorical re-organisation of ordinary experience (see § 4-6). One of the 
merits of improvisation is that it directly shows – in an unrepeatable real-
time and in unpredictable and surprising ways – how the creative work of 
imagination and the evaluative judgement of this work influence each other 
in an interactive and performative way. For in improvised dance, theatre and 
music performers imaginatively (though not always in a clear conscious 
way) elaborate ideas as to how and what to perform during the show. Each 
event of the performance is both the result of this imaginative work and 
triggers different (sometimes new) possibilities for the imagination. Actions, 
movements, sounds and image that co-performers and the performative 
environment produce during the performance are affordances to which each 
performer (should) react. Hence, every imaginative idea the single 
performer may have as to how to develop the performance is continuously 
called into question. It can be confirmed, but also criticised, modified, or 
rejected, by what other performers do, by the audience’s reaction and by 
environmental factors. The whole outcome of the imaginative activity of the 
performers ensues from the way each performer’s actions and reactions are 
performatively evaluated in the course of performance in interaction with 
the performative space. During the performance, the imaginative activity of 
each performer invites all co-performers to engage their imagination, in two 
ways : by a) imaginatively perceiving and understanding the outcomes of 
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the already-performed imagination; b) offering new material so that co-
performers and audience engage their own imagination while, and by means 
of, interpreting this material.  
The fundamental point is this. Both the organisational-interpretative 
and the explorative-creative imagination are engaged in the course of 
improvisation, while the outcomes of these activities are exhibited to fellow 
performers and to the audience. Improvisers are faced with the paradoxical 
task of imaginatively performing and interacting in a valuable way without 
knowing in advance whether the criteria upon which they base their activity 
and evaluate the whole process are, or at the end still will be, the right ones. 
They apply a rule without knowing whether it is the right one, that is, a rule 
which is not a rule, in the proper sense, but the generation of one. They are 
involved in a typical case of abductive reasoning, which unfolds in an 
interactive way and has performative effects.  
 
13. Audience imagination 
 
The third kind of imagination, as well as organisational and creative 
imagination, set in motion by improvised artistic performances is audience 
imagination
78
. This happens in two main ways : 
a) Audience imagination is set in motion by performers’ movements, 
gestures, and actions
79
. Like performers, spectators use organisational 
imagination in order to grasp the sense of the emergent accomplishment of 
the performance
80
. However, differently from that of the performers, 
audience imaginative attention does not necessarily contribute to the 
performance, it does not have an unavoidably performative power (although 
it can have performative power). Audience attention is active; only active 
attention allows the audience to follow the performers’ improvised gestures 
and actions. Like performers, listeners and beholders have some imaginative 
expectations regarding what might happen. Yet, since there is no artwork 
before the performance, they cannot previously know exactly whether their 
expectations will be confirmed or not. In some cases performers can 
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intentionally confuse the audience, offering only ambiguous and enigmatic 
images, movements, or sounds. Then audience imagination can go astray
81
. 
b) Like in non improvisational arts, audience imagination is set in 
motion by what performers do also for creatively shaping the artistic scene 
being enacted. Imagination is here the tool for the aesthetic apprehension of 
the artistic product, as Wollheim’s theory of twofoldness, Walton’s theory 
of make-believe, every theory of artistic appreciation as metaphorical 
understanding, and aesthetic theories of fruition as active construction, all 
try to explain. The improvised performance may be imaginatively grasped 
in the same way. It is often highly expressive, can have symbolic meaning 
of various kinds and, besides having contemplative aesthetic value, can even 
convey, precisely in virtue of its being improvised, social and political 
meaning and performative power.  
Therefore, due to the particular nature of improvisation, which, as an 
open and living system, builds its own borders
82
 and sometimes blurs the 
distinction between what is inside and what is outside, the performance (see 
§ 1), and, in some cases (for example in some cases of performance art) 
spectators « can be transferred into a liminal state, into a situation of in-
betweeness – […] between the real and the imagined, the performative and 
the imaginary »
83
. Especially in theatrical improvisations performed in non-
institutional venues, the artistic value of the performance can consist mainly 
in the way the creation of imagination that comes true in the improvisational 
process directly influences the moral, social, and political life of spectators 
and listeners, triggering changes in people’s minds and challenging the 
status quo. This is why established authorities may sometimes fear the 
imaginative power of improvisation and prohibit it. 
 
14. Conclusion 
 
As we saw in §1, this happened, for example, in Austria in the last 
decades of the eighteenth century, precisely when the ideological 
construction of the fine arts system reduced the role and the rank of 
improvisation in the arts. Improvisation began to be conceived as a practice 
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that lacks the right kind of aesthetic-contemplative imagination and, instead 
of being aesthetically disinterested, breaks the divide between art and life. 
There were allegedly good reasons for considering improvisation anti-
artistic in nature. In this paper I have argued that this view is misguided. 
Improvisation fits the requirement of art and aesthetics, and it even 
exemplifies artistic creation.  
Imagination has an important role in this. Imagination and 
improvisation share the abductive method of their making. The way 
imagination works can be labelled, to certain degrees and in some respects, 
improvisational. Improvisation needs imagination for the organisation of the 
process as well as for being creative. In particular, both organisational and 
creative imagination, in art and other human practices, proceed in an 
abductive way and in the production and appreciation of artworks the way 
imagination is engaged has improvisational traits. This is due, in turn, to the 
fact that both improvisation in everyday practices and artistic improvisation 
work abductively : in other words, organisational and creative imagination 
play essential roles in improvisational practices. So, just like imagination 
has, per se, improvisational traits, improvisation may be conceived as 
imagination performed in real-time. The way improvisers perform 
anticipatory and creative imagination on the spot is both for producers and 
for audiences one of the most intense pleasures of art experience. 
Interestingly, this specific value of artistic improvisation shows, in 
virtue of its link with imagination, a feature that holds for art in general. The 
criteria for an artwork’s success cannot be simply presupposed, but are 
established by the artwork itself
84
; the interpretation of the value and of the 
meaning of artworks proceeds in an abductive way, by seeking a general 
significance for a particular item, i.e. understanding the artwork as a 
metaphor. Since improvisers enact abductive metaphorical imagination in 
the course of performance, this is in turn at least a clue indicating that 
improvisation is not opposed to the categories of the aesthetic experience, 
but, rather, a structural – sometimes hidden – element of this experience. 
In sum up, in this paper I have argued that improvisation is not at 
odds with art and aesthetic experience. Instead of being anti-artistic and/or 
anti-aesthetic in nature, it is strongly tied to art and aesthetic experience. 
The strong link between art and improvisation is imagination, both 
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organisational and creative, conceived in abductive, metaphorical, and 
performative terms
85
. 
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